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Abstract 
 
 In the wake of 9/11 the U.S. Government has passed a host of counter-terrorism laws that 
provide the Executive Branch and the President of the United States frightening levels of 
authority. The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists of 2001 (AUMF) and 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA) include provisions or 
have been interpreted to allow the President to indefinitely detain terrorism suspects in military 
custody without charge or trial. This includes the potential application of these laws to American 
citizens. This thesis will analyze these statutes and relevant jurisprudence on the subject of 
indefinite detainment for both Americans and non-Americans. Ultimately, the analysis will show 
that the President of the United States does not have the constitutional authority to indefinitely 
detain US citizens in military custody who are taken into custody in the domestic United States. 
Thus, the detention provisions of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act are 
unconstitutional and should either be repealed by Congress or struck down by the Supreme 
Court. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Acknowledgements 
 
 There are so many people I would like to thank. First, I would like to thank Dr. Victor 
Asal of the Rockefeller College for guiding me throughout not just the thesis process, but also 
throughout my academic career at the University at Albany as my academic advisor. It was his 
TPOS 260 honors college course that enticed me into studying terrorism and the counter-
terrorism laws that have been created to stop it.  
 I would also like to extend my thanks to Dr. James Acker of the School of Criminal 
Justice. Dr. Acker was a terrific professor and an even greater moot court coach. I want to thank 
him for giving me the opportunity to compete on behalf of the University at Albany in the 
ACMA Moot Court Tournament series. It was moot court that helped me solidify my plans for 
law school and inspired me to examine the very counter-terrorism laws that this thesis is all 
about. 
 I would also like to thank Dr. Jeffrey J. Haugaard for accepting me into The Honors 
College and providing me with the many opportunities I have had here at the University. Without 
The Honors College and his tireless dedication to managing and growing the program I would 
not have had the good fortune of meeting the professors that have had such a big impact on my 
academic career.  
 I would also like to acknowledge both my family and friends for encouraging me to 
always set the bar for success higher and higher. I would like to thank my Mother and Father 
specifically for teaching me the values of a good education and a strong work ethic. I would also 
like to extend thanks to my friends that I have made both in and out of The Honors College. 
These friendships will last a lifetime and it is unfortunate that the four years we have had 
together will soon end. 
 4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract........................................................................................................................................... 2 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ 3 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 5 
Breaking Down The National Defense Authorization Act ............................................................ 7 
Section 1021: .............................................................................................................................. 7 
Section 1022.............................................................................................................................. 11 
Article II, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Writ of Habeas Corpus......................... 14 
Analysis of Relevant Supreme Court Case Law and Indefinite Detainment of Citizens ............ 16 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 30 
Appendix A – The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists of 2001 (Public 
Law 107-40) .................................................................................................................................. 33 
Appendix B – The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81)
....................................................................................................................................................... 35 
Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 ........................ 35 
Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 ........................ 36 
References .................................................................................................................................... 38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
Introduction 
 
The attacks of September 11th, 2001 started a security frenzy in the United States causing 
the restructuring of various intelligence agencies, and the creation of the cabinet level, 
Department of Homeland Security.1 However, the government's restructuring of the bureaucracy 
was not the only action it took in the name of preventing further acts of terrorism. Congress has 
passed a number of powerful statutes that were intended to empower the Executive Branch to 
prevent future acts of terrorism, arrest those involved in terrorist activity, and attack those 
persons or groups who threaten the United States, including United States citizens. 
Some of the statutes that Congress passed were given extensive media coverage, such as 
the Patriot Act. The Patriot Act, and surveillance programs that have similar or farther reaching 
surveillance powers than the Patriot Act authorizes, have received a great deal of public debate 
because of their controversial nature. Recently, the leaks of National Security Agency (NSA) 
contractor Edward Snowden have once again brought surveillance laws and the Executive 
Branch front and center in media coverage and public discourse.2 But, there are some laws that 
have flown under the radar and received very little media coverage, if at all. These laws are far 
more dangerous than intrusive governmental surveillance programs.  
The laws this paper will address specifically are Public Law 107-40, The Authorization 
for Use of Military Force (AUMF), and Public Law 112-81, The National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA). These laws, especially when read together, have the potential 
                                                      
1 Martin, Gus. Understanding terrorism. 4th ed. London: SAGE, 2013: 473-474 
2 The Economist Newspaper. "The Snowden effect." The Economist. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/08/american-surveillance (accessed May 6, 2014). 
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to not only violate the rights of US citizens, but to also erode the constitutional tradition the US 
has embraced since its creation by the founding fathers – a three branch government set up to 
ensure that no one branch holds too much power or becomes tyrannical.3 Of the three branches, 
the founders were extremely cautious when setting up the Executive Branch, with the potential 
for abuse and of tyranny that come out of unchecked executive authority.  
As will be discussed later in this paper, when read together these laws can be construed to 
authorize indefinite military detention of those who are merely suspected of having ties to terror 
organizations, regardless of their citizenship status. The reality of the situation is that these laws 
together form what can be referred to as a quasi state of martial law in the United States, where 
the military enforces laws and detains suspects, without charge or trial under the direction of the 
President of the United States. 
In 2012, New York Times Pulitzer Prize winning reporter Chris Hedges brought suit on 
behalf of journalists and citizens of the US against the indefinite detention provisions contained 
within section 1021 and 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act. The central issues of 
the Hedges case focus around a denial of 5th amendment due process rights and 1st amendment 
rights by sections 1021 and 1022.4 A U.S. District Court initially passed an injunction against the 
President’s use of the NDAA’s detention provisions; however, upon the Government’s appeal, 
the Court of Appeals overturned the lower court’s decision on the grounds that Hedges and his 
compatriots could not prove that any harm had been perpetrated on any of the stakeholders in the 
                                                      
3 Renzo, Anthony. "A Call to Protect Civilian Justice: Beware the Creep of Military Tribunals." American Constitution 
Society for Law and Policy. https://www.acslaw.org/files/Renzo%20Issue%20Brief_Final.pdf (accessed April 2, 
2014). 
4 Hedges v. Obama, 890 F.Supp.2d 424 (2012) 
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suit.5 Essentially, the Appeals court dodged the decision by attacking the petitioners’ standing 
instead of ruling on their challenge to the NDAA. 
This paper will analyze the constitutionality of indefinite military detainment without 
charge or trial of terror suspects captured on U.S. soil and who are U.S. citizens. The contention 
being that the National Defense Authorization Act’s section 1021 and 1022 military detention 
provisions are unconstitutional because the President lacks the relevant constitutional authority 
from Article II. Furthermore, the President’s indefinite detainment of U.S. citizens would 
constitute a violation of the separation of powers doctrine by implying an Executive suspension 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the declaration of martial law, removing citizens from the 
civilian criminal justice system and with it, all of its essential protections from governmental 
abuse. 
 
Breaking Down The National Defense Authorization Act 
 
Section 1021: 
 
 The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 was passed by 
Congress in December 20116. The National Defense Authorization Acts are normally mundane 
acts passed each year by Congress to fund the Department of Defense. The NDAAs also provide 
a way for Congress to direct new regulations or policies regarding the US military or Department 
of Defense. For example, over the past few years the NDAA’s have prohibited the closure of the 
                                                      
5 Hedges v. Obama (2012) 
6 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81 
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detention center at Guantanamo Bay by the Executive Branch.7 8 However, beginning in 
December 2011, the NDAA ’12 included several provisions relating to the military detention of 
terrorist suspects.9 As we will examine in this section, several provisions of the NDAA ’12, 
when combined with the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), can be read to allow 
the military detainment of U.S. citizens captured on U.S. soil without charge and without a 
public trial – in direct violation of their constitutionally protected due process rights. 
 The 2012 NDAA’s Title X, Subtitle D is dedicated to counter-terrorism policies of the 
Department of Defense. Within Subtitle D are sections 1021 and 1022 which explicitly 
authorizes detainment, by the US military, of terrorism suspects.  
 Section 1021 of the NDAA ’12 is titled “Affirmation of authority of the Armed Forces of 
the United States to detain covered persons pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force”.10 This reinforces the Executive Branch’s statements and briefs in numerous Supreme 
Court cases where it argued that it ultimately had the authority under the AUMF to detain terror 
suspects.11 The Bush Administration argued in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), that if 
the AUMF authorized deadly force, then less serious forms of force, including detention 
authority, must logically follow. Subsection A of sec. 1021, in general terms, affirms the ability 
of the President to use the armed forces to detain “covered persons…pending the disposition 
under the law of war”.12 The act defines “covered persons” as follows: 
(b) COVERED PERSONS. – A covered person under this section is any 
person as follows: 
 
                                                      
7 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239 
8 NDAA FY 2012 
9 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, Title X, Subtitle D, §1021, §1022 
10 Pub. L. No. 112-81, Title X, Subtitle D, §1021 
11 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), Boumediene v. Bush (2008) 
12 Pub. L. No. 112-81, Title X, Subtitle D, §1021 
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(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks 
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for 
those attacks. 
 
(2) A person who was part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban 
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a 
belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such 
enemy forces. 
 
Subsection b(1) is a fairly straight forward provision, but it is b(2) that embodies the vague, 
ambiguous policies that litter the statute. Subsection b(2) does not elaborate on what the phrase 
“substantially supported” entails, nor does it define what constitutes a “belligerent act”. Does a 
disgruntled US citizen who fires shots at a government building qualify as a “belligerent act”? If 
the President labeled that US citizen as a “covered person”, he could use the NDAA to have the 
military detain him in a military detention center without charge or trial, where if he was arrested 
and processed in the civilian criminal justice system, he would have to be charged and tried 
before a judge and jury. 
 Moving down to Subsection C, Disposition Under the Law of War, Subsection C(1) 
defines disposition under the law of war as “detention under the law of war without trial until the 
end of the hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force”.13 This clause 
will be discussed later in the paper, but the main issue with C(1) is that being detained until the 
end of hostilities implies that there will eventually be an end. The “War on Terror” has been 
ongoing since the passing of the AUMF in 2001. It is now 2014, that is 13 years of hostilities, 
and there currently is no end in sight as we continue to engage al-Qaeda across the Middle East 
and Africa. The current battle to dismantle al-Qaeda could last another decade or more.14 Even 
                                                      
13 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, Title X, Subtitle D, §1021 
14 Greenwald, Glenn. "Washington gets explicit: its 'war on terror' is permanent." theguardian.com. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/17/endless-war-on-terror-obama (accessed April 6, 
2014). 
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worse, the “war on terror” could continue indefinitely, and as a result, so would a US citizen’s 
military detention if they were held under C(1) of the NDAA.  
 The last few provisions of section 1021, however, solidify the government’s ability to 
actively partake in military detention pursuant to subsection C(1). Subsections D and E are as 
follows: 
(d) CONSTRUCTION. – Nothing in this section is intended to limit or 
expand the authority of the president or the scope of the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force 
(e) AUTHORITIES. – Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect 
existing law or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens, 
lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are 
captured or arrested in the United States 
 
Subsection D and E appear to be provisions added by Congress to try and limit the scope of the 
NDAA. Perhaps to aid the law in standing up to the rising level of scrutiny the US Supreme 
Court has been applying to indefinite detention cases since the passage of the AUMF.15 
Subsection D is attempting to limit the powers the NDAA gives the President by stating that the 
NDAA is not intended to limit or expand the authority the President already has under the 
AUMF. However, this is problematic in and of itself. The Executive Branch, under both former 
President Bush and President Obama have asserted that they have the authority under the AUMF 
to detain terror suspects in military custody regardless of their citizenship status, as was the case 
in Boumediene v. Bush.16 Thus, the language stating that “nothing in this section is intended to 
                                                      
15 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)  
16 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) 
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limit or expand” the authority of the president or the AUMF fails to protect the rights of US 
citizens as the Executive is arguing it already posses the necessary detention authority.  
 
Section 1022 
 
 Section 1022 of the NDAA serves to further define the procedure for detaining terror 
suspects. The title of Section 1022 is “Military Custody for Foreign Al-Qaeda Terrorists”.17 At 
face value it would appear that this section could be intended to be applied only to foreign terror 
suspects; however, as later examination will show, Congress fails to explicitly ban the President 
from applying the section to U.S. citizens. As the later analysis of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld will 
demonstrate, that the AUMF, from which the NDAA is derived, was used in that case to detain 
an American citizen. Subsection A, paragraph 1 states that “In General…the Armed Forces of 
the United States shall hold a person described in paragraph 2 [covered persons]... in military 
custody pending disposition under the law of war”, which creates a statutory requirement for the 
President to detain these suspects in military custody.18 
 Subsection A, paragraph 1’s reference to the “covered persons” provision is more 
problematic given paragraph 1’s requirement for military detainment. Paragraph 2 states: 
(2) COVERED PERSONS. – The requirement in paragraph (1) shall apply to 
any person whose detention is authorized under section 1021 who is determined- 
(A) to be a member of, or part of, al-Qaeda or an associated force that acts in 
coordination with or pursuant to the  direction of al-Qaeda; and 
                                                      
17 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, Title X, Subtitle D, §1022 
18 Pub. L. No. 112-81, Title X, Subtitle D, §1022, a(1) 
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(B) to have participated in the course of planning or carrying out an attack or 
attempted attack against the United States or its coalition partners”  
These provisions are relatively vague, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a U.S. 
citizen can be falsely believed by the government to either be a member of al-Qaeda or having 
either carried out a terror incident, or is in the stage of planning one, or conspiring to plan one. If 
it was any other crime, the citizen would be entitled to the normal civilian justice system process 
where they are formally indicted on charges by the Executive Branch (whether that be a local, 
state or the federal one) before a grand jury and the courts of the Judiciary who are empowered 
to ensure that the Executive Branch has enough evidence to proceed.19  
In this case, the NDAA is allowing the Executive to simply label the suspect an enemy 
combatant or construe the evidence so that it fits into the “Covered Persons” provisions of 
paragraph (2) and then can detain the individual indefinitely. It is important to note that the 
resulting detainment comes absent of being formally charged, let alone allowing a grand jury or a 
judge to determine whether or not the Government has enough evidence to both continue their 
detainment of the suspect, and to proceed forward with a trial. Of course those individuals who 
are being held indefinitely have no guarantee of a trial either, in addition to not being charged. 
Subsection B, paragraph (1) specifically refers to section 1022’s applicability to citizens 
of the United States. Paragraph (1) states that “The requirement to detain a person in military 
custody under this section does not extend to citizens of the United States”.20 This provision 
would appear to exempt U.S. citizens from the application of the NDAA’s detention authorities, 
but that would only be a superficial reading of this paragraph. It simply states that the 
                                                      
19 Weaver, Russell L.. Constitutional law: cases, materials & problems. 2nd ed. New York: Aspen Publishers, 2011. 
20 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, Title X, Subtitle D, §1022, b(1)  
 13 
requirement to detain “does not extend” to American citizens.21 This does not explicitly ban the 
detention of U.S. citizens under this section, it merely is not extending the requirement to do so 
that originates from subsection A, paragraph 1 of this section. Section 1022 already incorporates 
a level of Presidential discretion as Congress has provided the President with the ability to waive 
the requirement to detain “covered persons” for national security interests.22  
If there is any doubt as to whether or not the President believes he has this authority, look 
no further than President Obama’s signing statement. He stated “I want to clarify that my 
Administration will not authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American 
citizens”. He explained further that “I believe that doing so would break with our most important 
traditions as a Nation”.23 From these statements it can be inferred that President Obama does 
believe that the NDAA gives him the authority to detain U.S citizens, but he is simply not going 
to employ the detention provisions in that way. While President Obama thankfully believes that 
indefinite detainment of American citizens is against our constitutional traditions that does not 
mean that the next president, or a president years down the road won’t interpret the law in the 
same light. Suppose two presidents from now another terror attack on the scale of 9/11, or worse, 
happened. That president, given the political climate, might seek to imprison those he thought 
were involved, including American citizens without charge or trial. 
Being that Congress has already given the President a certain level of discretion when 
applying this section’s detention provisions, it stands to reason that a President can interpret this 
section as a whole as not explicitly banning the military detention of citizen terror suspects, 
                                                      
21 Pub. L. No. 112-81, Title X, Subtitle D, §1022, b(1) 
22 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, Title X, Subtitle D, §1022, b(4) 
23 Eviatar, Daphne. "Promises, Promises: President Obama's NDAA Signing Statement." The Huffington Post. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daphne-eviatar/promises-promises-preside_b_1182067.html (accessed April 6, 
2014). 
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effectively removing them from civilian courts and moving solely into the jurisdiction of the 
Executive Branch, through the auspices of the military.  
 
Article II, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus 
 
The founders set up the Government of the United States to ensure that no single branch 
could ever gain too much power.24 The founders achieved this by explicitly vesting different 
branches with different authorities. In cases surrounding the AUMF, the Executive Branch has 
argued that under Article II, the President’s commander-in-chief powers allows him to detain 
those he labels as enemy combatants or belligerents, including US citizens.25 However, as the 
evidence will show, giving the President the ability to detain US citizens under the NDAA’s 
provisions (and by extension, the AUMF’s as well) constitutes a violation of the separation of 
powers doctrine, and is done with the absence of any direct, vested powers given to the President 
under Article II of the Constitution.  
 The separation of powers dilemma arises from two major issues that the President’s 
detention authority under the AUMF and NDAA present when examining that authority against 
the powers vested to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. Both of these issues come 
from powers that in Article I of the Constitution were explicitly vested to the Congress. Congress 
was given the authority to suspend habeas corpus and to declare martial law. Having the military 
act as law enforcement and using military courts and review tribunals as Habeas substitutes both 
                                                      
24 Milkis, Sidney M., and Michael Nelson. The American presidency: origins and development, 1776-2011. 6th ed. 
Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012: 15-35 
25 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
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violate the constitution. The President would be unable to employ the military, an organ of the 
Executive Branch, in this way without explicit authorization from Congress in the form of 
suspension of Habeas and/or a declaration of martial law.  
 Focusing on the issue of Habeas Corpus, the NDAA would allow the President to detain 
U.S. citizens in indefinite military detention and they would primarily be examined by a military 
detainee review tribunal that, in theory, would impartially examine the government’s evidence 
for holding the terror suspect.26 However, several issues arise from this expectation. First, the 
review tribunal that would be effectively replacing a standard Habeas review in front of judge 
would be a military one, so it would be an extension of the Executive Branch. Thus, the 
Executive Branch would be both bringing allegations against the accused and would then be 
expected to impartially judge its own evidence to determine if the accused should continue to be 
held in military custody. This constitutes a grave breach of power under the separation of powers 
doctrine as the Executive Branch has essentially become the judge, jury, and depending on the 
case, the executioner.   
The Constitution and the earliest laws passed by the first Congresses ensured that an 
adversarial, separated system of justice was to be employed.27 The Judiciary would provide the 
impartial judges that would conduct Habeas reviews, while the Executive Branch, through the 
auspices of the police and the prosecutors, would bring evidence and charges against the 
accused. Here, the Executive is not even formerly charging the accused, it is simply bringing 
evidence to bear against the individual for purposes of indefinite detainment, and then is passing 
judgment on its own evidence to affirm the detainment process.28 The Executive is being trusted 
                                                      
26 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) 
27 Weaver, Russell L.. Constitutional law: cases, materials & problems. 2nd ed. New York: Aspen Publishers, 2011. 
28 Boumediene v. Bush (2008) 
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to carry out the duties that even the founders did not entrust to any single branch of the U.S. 
Government. 
 
Analysis of Relevant Supreme Court Case Law and Indefinite Detainment 
of Citizens 
 
 While there have been no Supreme Court cases that have explicitly involved the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2012, the Authorization for Use of Military Force and its implied 
detention authority has been challenged numerous times before the Court. Controlling cases in 
this area include Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), Boumediene v. Bush 
(2008), Rasul v. Bush (2004), Ex Parte Milligan (1866), and Ex Parte Quirin (1943). Hamdan, 
Hamdi, Rasul, and Boumediene are cases that arose out of challenges to the detention powers 
asserted by the Executive Branch pursuant to the AUMF. These cases when taken together are 
considered landmark cases when it comes to detainee rights and the “War on Terror”. It is 
important to note at the outset of this analysis that none of these cases barred the Executive from 
detaining suspects in indefinite detention. My argument will be more abstract, as the only one of 
these cases, Hamdi, involved an actual US citizen. And even Hamdi, involved a US citizen who 
was not on US soil at the time of his capture. When read together these cases tell a tale of a Court 
that is slowly reigning in the imperial nature of the post-9/11 Executive Branch. The other two 
cases, Milligan and Quirin, deal with military detention and Habeas Corpus during the Civil War 
and the Second World War, respectively.  
 We will examine Milligan and Quirin first as they are used as controlling case authorities 
for the present day set of detainee rights cases. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), is 
a case that arose out of the Civil War in the state of Indiana. Milligan and others were accused by 
 17 
the Union Army of planning to steal Union weapons, and assault prisoner of war camps to 
liberate Confederate soldiers. Milligan and his compatriots were tried in a military tribunal and 
sentenced to be hanged.29 They were able to appeal this decision after the war ended as their 
execution date was not set until May of 1865.  
 The Court ruled that the suspension by the government of Habeas Corpus during the Civil 
War was lawful, but citizens could not be tried under military tribunal in states that upheld the 
authority of the constitution and where civilian courts were open and operating (as they were in 
Indiana).30 31 What this ruling essentially boils down to is the Executive Branch cannot subject 
an American citizen to a military tribunal where the civilian courts are open. This presents a 
major obstacle to the NDAA and the AUMF. If a terror suspect happened to be an American 
citizen and was captured in the United States, would he still be subjected to the NDAA’s 
indefinite detention provisions?  
If you interpret the NDAA based on the detainment language in Section 1022, and the 
general affirmation in Section 1021 of the AUMF’s detention authorities, it would appear that 
the President does in fact have the ability to indefinitely detain American citizens who are 
captured on American soil. Under Milligan, such an action would clearly contradict the courts 
ruling as the NDAA and AUMF take a US citizen out of the civilian criminal justice system and 
place them in military custody – all while the civilian courts are in fact open and operating. 
Furthermore, the court upheld the ability for the military to detain these individuals pending the 
disposition of the laws of war but there is an important circumstantial caveat to take into 
                                                      
29 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) 
30 Ex Parte Milligan (1866) 
31 Renzo, Anthony. "A Call to Protect Civilian Justice: Beware the Creep of Military Tribunals." American 
Constitution Society for Law and Policy. https://www.acslaw.org/files/Renzo%20Issue%20Brief_Final.pdf (accessed 
April 2, 2014). 
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consideration.32 At the time of Milligan, Congress had officially suspended Habeas corpus and 
declared martial law in certain areas of the country. This would boost the Executive Branch’s 
authorities, especially its detention powers.33 The court was careful to note, however, that when 
Habeas Corpus is suspended the executive Branch cannot use that opportunity to try citizens in 
military courts, nor should it be executing them.34 
The other controlling case authority we will examine is Ex Parte Quirin,  
317 U.S. 1 (1942). Quirin throws a wrench in the precedents set by Milligan. Quirin is a case 
were Haupt, a US citizen who primarily grew up in Germany became a member of the Nazi 
party. He was joined by several Nazi agents and landed on the coast of Long Island, NY in a U-
Boat with a mission to sabotage American war industries. Haupt and his co-conspirators were 
caught by the FBI and were transferred to military custody as enemy combatants. The men were 
tried by military commission and sentenced to death35. The Supreme Court issued a quick 
decision allowing the execution to continue and then later released the full reasoning for their 
decision.36 
 The key issues in Quirin were over whether or not the Government had violated Haupt 
and the other co-conspirators’ Habeas rights, and if their detention and the military commission 
to try them were constitutionally sound. The Court ruled in favor of the Government stating that 
President Roosevelt was within his authority to both detain and try the men under military law.37 
While this verdict might indicate that the current AUMF and NDAA detention authorities are 
                                                      
32 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 1 (1866) 
33 Renzo, Anthony. "A Call to Protect Civilian Justice: Beware the Creep of Military Tribunals." American 
Constitution Society for Law and Policy. https://www.acslaw.org/files/Renzo%20Issue%20Brief_Final.pdf (accessed 
April 2, 2014). 
34 Ex Parte Milligan (1866) 
35 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) 
36 Renzo, 2008 
37 Ex Parte Quirin (1942) 
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constitutional, there are key differences between the nature of the AUMF/NDAA detainment 
authorities and the facts that surrounded Quirin.  
 The Government argued that it had the constitutional authority in a time of war to detain, 
try, and ultimately execute the conspirators on the grounds that they were unlawful combatants 
that violate the laws of war, and were thus not entitled to standard civilian trials. The Court in its 
decision stated that: 
“Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in 
addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts 
which render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without 
uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather 
military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant 
who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging 
war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who 
are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be 
offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military 
tribunals.” (317 U.S. 1) 
The court drew the distinction that the Government was arguing between lawful and unlawful 
combatants. The court found that the Germans, including Haupt, qualified as unlawful enemy 
combatants, and they were thus subject to military detention and punishment, and were not 
entitled to the rights of prisoners of war. They stated that the Germans fell “plainly within the 
ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals, and were held in good faith for trial 
by military commission, charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war 
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materials and utilities, entered or after entry remained in our territory without uniform”.38 The 
court further went on to say that such action constitutes “an offense against the law of war” and 
that the constitution authorizes these individuals to be tried by military commission.39  However, 
the applicability of this ruling to a NDAA type case, should one make it to the Supreme Court, is 
questionable. 
 A major difference between a future NDAA case and Quirin is that the circumstances 
surrounding Quirin involve a declared war in which the general strategy on all sides was “total 
war”, with the entire country was mobilized behind the war effort. The current “War on Terror” 
bears almost no similarities to the Second World War context of Quirin. Another difference is 
the classification of the individual or individuals as combatants. To the extent that Quirin was not 
simply a case decided during the war hysteria of the time, the court’s decision was based on the 
initial classification of Haupt and his co-conspirators as unlawful enemy combatants, making 
them akin to spies in a time of war.  
The Government attorney, Attorney General Biddle, argued that the Government had the 
ability to punish the accused in military commissions because of the text of the 1789 Alien 
Enemies Act that among other provisions, authorized the treatment of those individuals who 
were associated with a foreign government who the United States had a declared war with were 
to be treated as enemy aliens.40 Biddle’s central argument throughout Quirin was that the 
Germans were acting under the authority of the German Government and had entered U.S. 
territory illegally in secret, ditching their military uniforms for civilian clothes as spies or 
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saboteurs. This, he argued and with which the court later agreed with, was an offense against the 
law of war and qualified them to be detained and tried by the military.  
 Quirin presents a contradiction to the ruling of Milligan discussed earlier. Milligan held 
that citizens should not be tried under military jurisdiction if the civilian courts were open and 
operating. During the time of Quirin the civilian courts were indeed open and operating, as was 
referenced by the counsel for the Germans.41 The court drew a distinction between Milligan and 
Quirin by reasoning that Milligan, while he was accused of conspiring to aid the Confederacy, 
was not actually a member of the Confederate Army nor was he acting on behalf of the 
Confederate Army.42 This differs from Quirin where accused were either a part of the German 
Armed Forces or were acting on their behalf. Additionally, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004), Justice Scalia noted that to the extent that Quirin remains good law, a major difference 
between Milligan and Quirin is that in Quirin none of the accused ever contested their status of 
being in the German Armed Forces.43 In Milligan, he did dispute his status and Justice Scalia 
reasons that this is the key differentiator since by not contesting their associations with the 
German Armed Forces the Germans were essentially admitting to being agents of a hostile, 
foreign government.44  
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) is perhaps the most significant case in this 
analysis. Yaser Hamdi was an Arab-American citizen who was caught on the battlefields of 
Afghanistan by Northern Alliance and US forces in a Taliban unit. He was detained as an enemy 
combatant and sent to military custody in the United States. He was ordered by President Bush to 
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be held in indefinite military detention, pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force. 
Yaser Hamdi was subsequently denied access to counsel or the Federal Courts.45 His father filed 
a Habeas petition in the US District Court for Eastern Virginia that brought the case into the 
Federal Court system. The Supreme Court eventually ruled that those who were detained were 
required to have due process protections afforded to them, including having a right to counsel 
and to the Federal Courts. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), which was decided on the same 
day as Hamdi, affirmed the Federal Court’s jurisdiction over military detention centers like 
Guantanamo Bay and extended Habeas rights to those facilities.46 While both of these rulings 
would appear to expressly allow the detainment of a US citizen, there are quite a few issues that 
the opinions of the court raised. 
 One major issue with Hamdi was that there was no “majority” opinion, it was instead a 
plurality decision. This weakens the precedential value of the case as it was not a clear, firmly 
grounded opinion. The plurality, written by Justice O’Conner, makes an interesting note on the 
precedential value of the case by stating that:  
“For the purposes of this case, the enemy combatant that it is seeking to detain is 
an individual who, it alleges, was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United 
States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict 
against the United States there. We therefore answer only the narrow question 
before us, whether the detention of citizens falling within that definition is 
authorized” (542 U.S. 507, Pg. 8) 
The Court was careful to note that Hamdi’s decision should be interpreted narrowly based on the 
specific facts of the case. Hamdi was a US citizen who was caught on an active battlefield during 
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a time of open conflict between the United States, its allies, and the Taliban. The Court, in 
essence, has limited the AUMF’s detention authority on US citizens to those who are captured in 
an active combat zone by US forces or their allies. Being that the NDAA is essentially a beefed 
up version of the AUMF, it would logically follow that the NDAA’s authority in this area should 
also be limited to the narrow facts surrounding Hamdi. However, the NDAA makes no mention 
or differentiation between the laws applicability to US citizens arrested abroad or those arrested 
in the domestic United States. This leaves open the possibility that a future President could 
interpret the statute as Congress conferring upon him the authority to detain even domestically 
arrested American citizens in military custody.  
 As the previous cases illustrate, the President has some authority to detain individuals and 
set up military tribunals. However, most of the cases the Executive has won in the Supreme 
Court did not directly involve US citizens. For example, in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld the court asserted that it had jurisdiction over Habeas petitions coming from 
Guantanamo Bay Detention Center and overseas US operated prisons even though they were not 
technically on US soil.47 They also extended certain procedural safeguards to foreign inmates at 
those prisons. While those two cases did not directly address the issue of whether or not the 
Executive could detain these individuals indefinitely, it appears that by only addressing the 
Habeas issues arising for their detainment, that the court was allowing the indefinite detention of 
foreign nationals. The applicability of such a precedent to Americans remains murky, as the 
previous analysis of Hamdi demonstrates.  
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 The President, even during a time of war, does not have unilateral authority to establish 
military trials unless they are used as war-courts or are used as part of a military government in 
an occupied territory.48 The only other way for military courts to be established outside of this 
limited Presidential authority is for Congress to explicitly authorize them.49 While the focus of 
our analysis is on indefinite detention, the establishment of military commissions necessarily 
infers detention authority, as you would have to detain individuals prior to conducting, if at all, a 
military commission. But, per the current interpretation of the AUMF, and the NDAA’s 
detention language, in order for a person to be transferred to military custody the President must 
label them an enemy combatant. However, the definition of enemy combatant is vague and from 
time to time has been obscured.  
The term enemy combatant obviously covers any individual who is physically engaged in 
battle against U.S. Armed Forces. For those individuals that fall outside of the battlefield, the 
Quirin Court stated that the legal category of “enemy combatant” is limited to the members of 
the enemy’s armed forces.50 Given the circumstances of Quirin this implies that the reason for 
which Haupt, a US citizen, was allowed to be detained, tried, and ultimately executed by the 
military was because he was acting on behalf of the German Armed Forces when he landed on 
Long Island to commit acts of sabotage and espionage.51 52 In Hamdi, while Hamdi was an 
American citizen, the circumstances of his capture closely resemble those of Haupt and his co-
conspirators. Hamdi was captured fighting in a Taliban unit on the battlefield, so he fits both 
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Quirin definitions of enemy combatant – he was captured on an active battlefield and was acing 
on behalf of an enemy of the United States.  
Again, while both Quirin and Hamdi would both be authoritative cases in a Supreme 
Court challenge to the NDAA, both American citizens in those cases were members of, or acting 
on behalf of, hostile armed forces engaged in combat with the United States. Another case, 
Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723 (2008), dealt specifically with the procedures that the 
Executive had to take to improve the combatant status review tribunals, which were the fact 
finding bodies set up by the military in an attempt to comply with the court’s recommendations 
following the Hamdi ruling. The combatant status tribunals were meant to afford some measure 
of Habeas protections to Guantanamo detainees, and those held at other US military detention 
centers.  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene asserted that the government had to 
do more to protect the Habeas rights of detainees. In his opinion Kennedy states: 
“An adequate substitute [for Habeas] must offer the prisoner a meaningful 
opportunity to demonstrate he is held pursuant to an erroneous application or 
interpretation of relevant law, and the decision making body must have some 
ability to correct errors, assess sufficiency of the government’s evidence, and to 
consider relevant exculpatory evidence” (533 U.S. 723 (2008)) 
The Court was willing to allow the Executive to conduct the review tribunals themselves, 
independently of the Judiciary as long as the Executive provided what it deemed were the 
essential components of the Writ. However, Boumediene is yet another case that involves foreign 
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nationals and not American citizens, so there remains a question over whether or not the Court’s 
decision would have been different had the individual being detained was a citizen.53  
Other language stemming from Boumediene also seems to obscure an authoritative stance 
by the court on detainee rights and military detainment under the AUMF. Justice Kennedy later 
stated in the opinion of the court that “…[the] political branches cannot turn on and off the parts 
of the constitution that suits them”, making reference to the Executive Branch’s argument that 
the President was authorized to replace or restrict certain Habeas rights and that these actions 
were un-reviewable by the court because the court was not properly suited for dealing with 
military affairs.54 Justice Scouter in his concurrence noted the exceptionally long periods of 
detention some of the Guantanamo detainees had endured to this stage without adequate methods 
to challenge their detention. Justice Scouter specifically recalled that some were detained for 
over six years.55 The opinion of the court also stated that “the Habeas court must have sufficient 
authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s 
power to detain”.56 This calls into question another major pillar of separation of powers, and is 
where the court’s decision could fall apart if a future NDAA challenge arises that involves a U.S. 
citizen being held by the military.  
If the Executive took the Court’s Boumediene decision and implemented the Court’s 
prescribed procedural safeguards that are meant to provide a substitute to the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, the accused would still have to trust that the Executive Branch can self regulate and self 
check itself. This flies contrary to the essence of separation of powers. How can we be certain 
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that justice is being served if there is no true independent, impartial third party who will pass 
judgment on the government’s evidence for indefinite detainment. Given the recent revelations 
about covert government torture programs, advanced and invasive surveillance programs, and 
the President’s decision to order a drone strike on an American-citizen cleric on Yemen without 
a trial, or even consulting the judiciary or the Congress should lend credence to the fears that a 
newly empowered Executive armed with the NDAA’s broad detention authority could run 
amuck over the constitutional protections that Americans have enjoyed up until the September 
11th attacks.57 58 
Looking at the previously mentioned cases in totality, a history begins to form where the 
Executive Branch has dramatically expanded its authority immediately after the September 11th 
attacks and then has had its detention authorities restricted more and more with each subsequent 
case from Hamdi (2004) and Rasul (2004) to Hamdan (2006) and Boumediene (2008). While 
Hamdi is the only one of these cases that involved a U.S. citizen, he was captured on the 
battlefields of Afghanistan, armed, and in a Taliban unit. In other words, he fit the primary 
definition of an Enemy Combatant, and was subject to military detention until the end of 
hostilities, as long as the Executive changed its detention procedures to allow for Habeas reviews 
to apply to detainees. Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene all served to further extend Habeas rights 
to the non-citizen detainees involved in those cases. Speaking to Boumediene specifically, the 
Court harshly rebutted the Executive’s assertion that the Court had no jurisdiction over Status 
Tribunals and their procedures because of both the President’s war powers and Congress’ 
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Detainee Treatment Act that attempted to empower the military to set up the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals mentioned earlier. 
Given the Court’s tightening grip on the Executive’s use of the military for indefinite 
detainment and military commissions for certain terror suspects, it seems highly likely that any 
case arising from the NDAA’s sections 1021 and 1022 detention powers would be ruled 
unconstitutional to be applied to US citizens. Because the NDAA does not specifically mention 
whether it is meant to be applied overseas or domestically (or both), it can be interpreted as 
applying to terror suspects on US soil, including citizens. If the President was to take a citizen 
out of the civilian justice system and place them either in indefinite military detainment or try 
them before a military commission it would expressly violate the Milligan Court’s “open-courts” 
doctrine, where if the civilian courts are open and operating, it is unconstitutional to try citizens 
in military commissions, or hold them in military custody.  
It is important to remember that not holding these suspects in military custody does not 
mean that the government loses its much needed ability to fight terrorism, it simply requires the 
government to carry out that essential duty under the framework of the civilian criminal justice 
system. After all, it was specifically created to correct the wrongs our Founders experienced at 
the hands of the English King, and it would be decidedly un-American to allow our President to 
use the military as a domestic law enforcement tool, and this could lead to the violation of 
citizens’ rights and the potential for political repression, as was the case at the time of King 
George and George Washington. This analysis of course assumes that the U.S. citizen in 
question is not a confirmed member of a hostile nation’s Armed Forces. For example, if the 
citizen had left and joined the Taliban, and then returned to the United States where he was 
eventually captured, then he would fit the Quirin court’s enemy combatant category that covers 
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those who are members of an enemy’s military but who are not captured on a field of battle. 
Additionally, if the Executive did try to detain a non-enemy military affiliated American citizen 
on U.S. soil, and declares that citizen an enemy combatant, would in essence be asserting that the 
entirety of the United States is a battlefield in the War on Terror. Such a distinction would be 
absolutely unprecedented, and surely would fail to pass constitutional muster, let alone a review 
of fact.  
Touching again on the Combatant Status Review Tribunals that the Executive has set up 
at military detention centers of those individuals labeled “enemy combatants”, the Executive’s 
self-regulating authority would surely violate the separation of powers doctrine if directly 
challenged in front of the Court. While Boumediene could be viewed as a bit of a step backward 
for the Court in the sense that it broke the Court’s streak of cases that continued to chip away at 
the President’s military detention powers, it did not involve U.S. citizen terrorism detainees. 
Given the Court’s difficulty in coming to a clear consensus on allowing the Executive to detain 
U.S. citizens indefinitely, as evidenced by the weakened authority of the plurality opinion in 
Hamdi, it stands to reason that the court would strike down the President’s ability to detain U.S. 
citizens pursuant to the NDAA’s vague detention provisions. Remember, these case authorities 
we have examined involved the older AUMF, from which the NDAA is derived, and the Court 
has had some significant reservations on the detention powers the Executive Branch has 
interpreted the AUMF as having provided it.59  
 It is a logical expectation to see the Court progress down a path of totally preventing the 
Executive from detaining those citizens who have no confirmed connection to an enemy 
government as enemy combatants without charge or trial in indefinite detainment. Given the 
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controlling Milligan “open-court” doctrine, the controversial, potential separation of powers 
violating Review Tribunals, and the lack of previous, directly analogous cases involving 
American citizens who have not had their enemy government affiliations proven, the National 
Defense Authorization Act should be ruled by the court, unconstitutional.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 After much analysis, it should now be clear that the President and the Executive Branch 
do not have the relevant authorities under existing law or the Constitution to detain U.S. citizens 
in indefinite military detention, at will. Article II of the Constitution does provide the President 
with significant war powers, and during a time of war, the Court has been willing to defer to the 
Executive Branch on matters of war and national security, as was stated by the Court in 
Youngstown and Curtiss-Wright.60 61 However, the Court states in Hamdi that “we necessarily 
reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily 
circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances”, rejecting the Executive’s contention 
that the courts have no role in military detention or military commission procedures.62  
The Hamdi court also stated that “we have long since made clear that a state of war is not 
a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the nation’s citizens”.63 The 
National Defense Authorization Act’s detention statutes are murky at best when referring to U.S. 
citizens. The President should not have the discretion under the NDAA to determine if he will 
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use it to detain U.S. citizens, as this constitutes a violation of separation of powers as the 
President would be, in essence, suspending Habeas corpus and declaring martial law at the same 
time, when Article I of the Constitution specifically vests those powers to Congress. To date, 
Congress has not suspended the Writ of Habeas Corpus, nor have they declared martial law, 
which makes the NDAA’s potential to allow the President to use the military domestically, 
illegal.  
Based on the Milligan precedent, any attempt by the President to use the military to carry 
out domestic law enforcement and remove American citizens from the civilian criminal justice 
system, and all of the protections and rights that come with it, would be unconstitutional as long 
as the civilian courts were open and operating. Again, this is assuming that the American citizen 
is not a member of the enemy’s armed forces, per the precedent set under Ex Parte Quirin. Given 
the difficulty of establishing connections between terrorists and terror groups, there remains a 
high possibility that the government could get bad evidence or make the wrong conclusions from 
the limited amount of evidence they may possess. It is critical that the Court in the future assures 
that the American citizens are processed through the civilian justice system, which requires 
Grand Jury indictments (i.e., criminal charges), exceptional Habeas protections, and a jury trial.64  
Allowing an American citizen to be sent to a military prison where the military, who are 
subordinate to the President, their Commander-in-chief, are trusted to self-regulate and self-
correct errors in evidence or combatant status is an unprecedented step in the wrong direction for 
the country. In these turbulent and dangerous times, it is important to remember Justice 
O’Connor’s foreboding assertion in the Hamdi plurality: “It is during our most challenging and 
uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is 
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in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we 
fight for abroad”.65 Is America going to allow the fear of terrorism to compromise the values we 
have been fighting to uphold since the days of the Revolution?  
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Appendix A – The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 
Terrorists of 2001 (Public Law 107-40) 
 
Public Law 107–40 
107th Congress 
Joint Resolution 
 
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible 
for the recent attacks launched against the United States. 
Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were 
committed against the United States and its citizens; and 
Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that 
the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect 
United States citizens both at home and abroad; and 
Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and foreign 
policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence; 
and 
Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United 
States; and 
Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitution to 
take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism 
against the United States: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 
 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This joint resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Authorization for 
Use of Military Force’’. 
 
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—That the President is authorized to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent 
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States 
by such nations, organizations or persons. 
(b) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.— 
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.—Consistent with 
section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress 
declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory 
authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the 
War Powers Resolution. 
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in 
this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers 
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Resolution. 
Approved September 18, 2001. 
 
 
(Source: US Government Printing Office, Public Law 107-40) 
 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf 
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Appendix B – The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 
(Public Law 112-81) 
 
 
Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 
 
Subtitle D—Counterterrorism 
 
SEC. 1021. AFFIRMATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF 
THE UNITED STATES TO DETAIN COVERED PERSONS 
PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY 
FORCE. 
 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Congress affirms that the authority of the 
President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40; 
50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority for the Armed Forces 
of the United States to detain covered persons (as defined in subsection 
(b)) pending disposition under the law of war. 
(b) COVERED PERSONS.—A covered person under this section 
is any person as follows: 
(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
or harbored those responsible for those attacks. 
(2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported 
al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged 
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, 
including any person who has committed a belligerent act or 
has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy 
forces. 
 
(c) DISPOSITION UNDER LAW OF WAR.—The disposition of a 
person under the law of war as described in subsection (a) may 
include the following: 
(1) Detention under the law of war without trial until 
the end of the hostilities authorized by the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force. 
(2) Trial under chapter 47A of title 10, United States 
Code (as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009 
(title XVIII of Public Law 111–84)). 
(3) Transfer for trial by an alternative court or competent 
tribunal having lawful jurisdiction. 
(4) Transfer to the custody or control of the person’s country 
of origin, any other foreign country, or any other foreign entity. 
(d) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section is intended to limit 
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or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force. 
 
(e) AUTHORITIES.—Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention of 
United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, 
or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United 
States. 
 
(f) REQUIREMENT FOR BRIEFINGS OF CONGRESS.—The Secretary 
of Defense shall regularly brief Congress regarding the application 
of the authority described in this section, including the organizations, 
entities, and individuals considered to be ‘‘covered persons’’ 
for purposes of subsection (b)(2). 
 
 
(Source: U.S. Government Printing Office, Public Law 112-81, Subtitle D, Section 1021) 
 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ81/pdf/PLAW-112publ81.pdf 
 
 
 
Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 
 
SEC. 1022. MILITARY CUSTODY FOR FOREIGN AL-QAEDA TERRORISTS. 
 
(a) CUSTODY PENDING DISPOSITION UNDER LAW OF WAR.— 
(b)  
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (4), the 
Armed Forces of the United States shall hold a person described 
in paragraph (2) who is captured in the course of hostilities 
authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(Public Law 107–40) in military custody pending disposition 
under the law of war. 
 
(2) COVERED PERSONS.—The requirement in paragraph (1) 
shall apply to any person whose detention is authorized under 
section 1021 who is determined— 
(A) to be a member of, or part of, al-Qaeda or an 
associated force that acts in coordination with or pursuant 
to the direction of al-Qaeda; and 
(B) to have participated in the course of planning or 
carrying out an attack or attempted attack against the 
United States or its coalition partners. 
 
(3) DISPOSITION UNDER LAW OF WAR.—For purposes of this 
subsection, the disposition of a person under the law of war 
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has the meaning given in section 1021(c), except that no 
transfer otherwise described in paragraph (4) of that section 
shall be made unless consistent with the requirements of section 
1028. 
 
(4) WAIVER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY.—The President may 
waive the requirement of paragraph (1) if the President submits 
to Congress a certification in writing that such a waiver is 
in the national security interests of the United States. 
 
(b) APPLICABILITY TO UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND LAWFUL 
RESIDENT ALIENS.— 
 
(1) UNITED STATES CITIZENS.—The requirement to detain 
a person in military custody under this section does not extend 
to citizens of the United States. 
(2) LAWFUL RESIDENT ALIENS.—The requirement to detain 
a person in military custody under this section does not extend 
to a lawful resident alien of the United States on the basis 
of conduct taking place within the United States, except to 
the extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States. 
 
(c) IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES.— 
(d)  
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall issue, and 
submit to Congress, procedures for implementing this section. 
 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The procedures for implementing this section 
shall include, but not be limited to, procedures as follows: 
 
(A) Procedures designating the persons authorized to 
make determinations under subsection (a)(2) and the 
process by which such determinations are to be made. 
 
(B) Procedures providing that the requirement for military 
custody under subsection (a)(1) does not require the 
interruption of ongoing surveillance or intelligence gathering 
with regard to persons not already in the custody 
or control of the United States. 
 
(C) Procedures providing that a determination under 
subsection (a)(2) is not required to be implemented until 
after the conclusion of an interrogation which is ongoing 
at the time the determination is made and does not require 
the interruption of any such ongoing interrogation. 
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(D) Procedures providing that the requirement for military 
custody under subsection (a)(1) does not apply when 
intelligence, law enforcement, or other Government officials 
of the United States are granted access to an individual 
who remains in the custody of a third country. 
 
(E) Procedures providing that a certification of national 
security interests under subsection (a)(4) may be granted 
for the purpose of transferring a covered person from a 
third country if such a transfer is in the interest of the 
United States and could not otherwise be accomplished. 
 
(d) AUTHORITIES.—Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to affect the existing criminal enforcement and national security 
authorities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other 
domestic law enforcement agency with regard to a covered person, 
regardless whether such covered person is held in military custody. 
 
(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect on the 
date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
and shall apply with respect to persons described in subsection 
(a)(2) who are taken into the custody or brought under 
 
(Source: U.S. Government Printing Office: Public Law 112-81, Subtitle D, Section 1022) 
 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ81/pdf/PLAW-112publ81.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
